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 Abstract 
Banks are usually better informed on the loans they originate than other financial intermediaries. 
As a result, securitized loans might be of lower credit quality than otherwise similar non-
securitized loans. We assess the effect of securitization activity on loans’ relative credit quality 
employing a uniquely detailed dataset from the euro-denominated syndicated loan market. We 
find that, at issuance, banks do not seem to select and securitize loans of lower credit quality. 
Following securitization, however, the credit quality of borrowers whose loans are securitized 
deteriorates by more than those in the control group. We find tentative evidence suggesting that 
poorer performance by securitized loans might be linked to banks’ reduced monitoring 
incentives. From our findings it follows that current iniciatives on risk retention by the 
originator, and more detailed loan-by-loan information on loan credit quality would be useful to 
reap out the benefits of securitization. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Securitization has been perceived as a major contributing factor to the 2007-2009 financial crisis 
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). Following the crisis, U.S. authorities have 
investigated a number of banks over claims related to selling loans of lower credit quality to 
unsuspecting investors.  
What is the impact of securitization on loans’ credit quality? Have banks sold, through 
securitization, poor quality loans to unsuspecting outsiders? This paper aims to contribute to this 
discussion by comparing the credit quality of securitized and non-securitized loans and tracking 
their differences in performance over time.  
We focus on the European market which, we believe, is a good laboratory to assess the impact of 
securitization on credit quality. In Europe the securitization markets started very timidly in the 
late 1990s, and developed significantly only from 2004 to 2007. The sudden appearance of 
securitization in Europe probably allows for a clearer assessment of its effects on the banking 
behavior and the financial system than in the U.S., where the use of securitization has been 
widespread since the late 1960s. 
In practical terms, we contrast the future credit performance of securitized versus non-securitized 
loans which, prior to securitization, were very similar in terms of their observable characteristics 
(such as risk, price, maturity, size etc.). We use of a unique dataset that allows us to identify 
those loans that were eventually securitized. We first link the probability of loan securitization to 
a set of loan, borrower and lender characteristics. We then track changes in loans’ credit quality 
as measured by borrowers’ expected default frequencies (EDF), as measured by Moody’s KMV.  
We find that at issuance, and based on observable characteristics, originating banks do not seem 
to select and securitize lower quality corporate loans to outside investors. Yet following 
securitization, the credit quality of borrowers whose loans are securitized deteriorated by more 
than those whose loans were not securitized. While this underperformance could be due to a 
number of causes, we provide some tentative evidence suggesting that the poorer performance of 
securitized loans might be linked to banks’ reduced incentives to monitor securitized loans. 
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1 Introduction 
Banks generate proprietary information and tend to have superior knowledge on the credit 
quality of the loans they originate. As a result, banks might have an incentive to securitize loans 
of lower credit quality to unsuspecting investors (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995). Largely for this 
reason, securitization has been perceived as a major contributing factor to the 2007-2009 
financial crisis (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). Following the crisis, authorities 
have investigated a number of banks over claims related to mis-sold securitized loans.1  
In this direction, recent empirical evidence suggests that banks tend to securitize the 
riskier mortgages of their portfolio (see for instance Krainer and Laderman, 2014; Elul, 2015). 
Yet, evidence on the impact of securitization on corporate loans on credit quality remains very 
limited, it is circumscribed to the U.S. and seems to offer contradictory results (Benmelech et al., 
2012; Bord and Santos, 2015; Wang and Xia, 2015).  
We assess the credit quality of securitized loans on the euro-denominated corporate loan 
market. In practical terms, we contrast the credit performance of securitized versus non-
securitized loans over time. We link the probability of loan securitization to a set of loan, 
borrower and lender characteristics and track changes in loans’ credit quality as measured by 
borrowers’ expected default frequencies. In the robustness checks we also employ alternative 
methodologies —including propensity score matching— to compare the credit risk of securitized 
1 For instance, JP Morgan and Bank of America agreed to pay USD 4.5 and 9.1 billion, respectively, to settle court 
cases with institutional investors regarding miss-sold mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The U.S. Federal Housing 
Finance Agency reached settlements of around USD 16.5 billion with eighteen major financial institutions alleged to 
be involved in securities law violations and fraud in the sale of MBS to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. On a separate 
case, Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase agreed to pay around USD 15 billion to the U.S. Department of Justice over 
allegations related to misled investors on MBS during the time leading up to the 2007-2009 crisis. 
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and non-securitized corporate loans which, prior to securitization, were very similar in terms of 
their observable characteristics. 
We use a unique dataset obtained directly from securitization trustees operating in the 
European Union (EU). We construct this dataset by getting access to the portfolios of the 
majority of euro-denominated collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) so we have a representative 
picture of the market, which includes public as well as private deals. Our detailed loan level 
dataset allows us to distinguish, among all syndicated loans, those that were eventually 
securitized.  
We focus on the euro-denominated CLO market which, we believe, is a good laboratory 
to assess the impact of securitization on credit quality. In Europe the securitization markets 
started very timidly in the late 1990s, and developed significantly only from 2004 to 2007. In 
contrast, in the U.S. the introduction and growth of securitization markets has been much more 
continuous over time. The sudden appearance of securitization in Europe probably allows for a 
clearer assessment of its effects on the banking behavior and the financial system than in the U.S. 
Concentrating on corporate loan securitization also provides a useful perspective as most 
of the existing securitization literature focuses on the mortgage market. Mortgage lending, tends 
to be relatively mechanical and the credit risk of mortgage backed securities (MBS) is heavily 
reliant on housing prices. In contrast, corporate lending decisions are more dependent on 
idiosyncratic, and often proprietary, information on the credit quality of borrowers that is often 
obtained over time via lending relationships. In other words, information asymmetries are likely 
to be particularly pronounced in the securitization of corporate loans as the idiosyncratic risk of 
individual borrowers —which is often difficult to ascertain for outside investors in comparison to 
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the mortgage market— plays a large role.2 As a result, the screening and monitoring by the 
lender of individual borrowers would be expected to have a bigger impact on the performance of 
corporate loans after securitization than for other types of loans.  
We find that, based on borrowers’ publicly available information at issuance, originating 
banks do not seem to select and securitize lower quality corporate loans to outsiders. Following 
securitization, however, the credit quality of borrowers whose loans are securitized deteriorated 
by more than those in the control group. While this underperformance could be due to a number 
of causes, we provide some tentative evidence suggesting that the poorer performance of 
securitized loans might be linked to banks’ reduced incentives to monitor securitized loans. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews and draws 
hypotheses from the related literature. Section 3 describes the data sources and explains the 
empirical methodology used in the analysis. The results of estimations are presented and 
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Literature and Hypotheses  
There is significant evidence from the U.S. suggesting that banks that resorted more intensively 
to securitization activity in the years prior to the crisis relaxed their lending standards more 
aggressively than other institutions (Keys et al., 2011; Dell’Ariccia, 2012; Nadauld and 
Weisbach, 2012). There is also evidence linking securitization activity and increases in bank 
2 At the same time, syndicated loans are sizable and, unlike other types of , their terms are usually publicly 
announced when the deals are signed by consortium of banks and the borrower so there is usually more information 
available than for other types of loans (see Sufi, 2007, on the dynamics of syndicated loan formation). For instance 
during the process of structuring and placing deals the underwriters and originators of the deal provide extensive 
information to investors which allows them to broadly assess the riskiness of the loans underlying the CLO. 
However, in comparison to mortgage securitization, which is mostly driven by economic fundamentals and house 
prices, it continues to be more complicated for investors to value each and every corporate loan underlying the 
security.    
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risk-taking (Goderis et al., 2007; Instefjord, 2005; Haensel and Krahnen, 2007), and augmented 
systemic risk (Michalak and Uhde, 2013; Krahnen and Wilde, 2008; Brunnermeier and Sannikov 
2014; Wagner, 2007).3 
In contrast, other studies do not find evidence suggesting that securitization led to riskier 
lending activities (Shivdasani and Wang, 2011 for leveraged buyouts; Casu et al., 2013 for 
overall bank risk; Albertazzi et al., 2015 for the Italian market; Kara et al., 2016 for Europe). 
There is also literature that underlines the potential benefits of securitization suggesting that it 
supports financial stability by smoothing out risks among many investors (Duffie, 2008), 
improving banks’ ability to manage credit risk (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004) and increasing 
banks’ profitability (Jiangli et al., 2007). 
More closely related to our paper, some of the empirical work examines the performance 
of loans after they have been securitized although evidence is limited and, at times, inconclusive. 
Some of these studies suggest that in the U.S. the credit quality of securitized corporate loans is 
not worse than that of non-securitized loans (Benmelech et al., 2012; Wang and Xia, 2015).4 
Alternatively there is also evidence that finds inferior credit performance for securitized loans 
after securitization (Bord and Santos, 2015). For the mortgage market, recent results suggest that 
in the U.S. banks securitized ex-ante their riskiest mortgages, and that following securitization 
the delinquency rates for securitized mortgages were higher than for non-securitized (Krainer 
and Laderman, 2014; Elul, 2015). On the other hand, looking at the pre-crisis period, Ambrose et 
3 There is also evidence showing that securitization inhibits distressed borrowers’ loan renegotiations (Piskorski et 
al., 2010).  
4 These authors report some evidence of under-performance for securitized loans originated between 2005 and 2007 
although they suggest that this is not consistent across samples, performance measures, and horizons. 
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al., (2005) show that in the U.S. securitized mortgages experienced lower ex-post defaults than 
those retained by banks. 
We analyze whether banks securitized their lower quality euro-denominated corporate 
loans in the build up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Information asymmetries on the credit 
quality of borrowers between originating banks and purchasers of CLOs provide banks with the 
initial opportunity to do so as originators are likely to have more information about borrowers 
than the buyers of the CLOs. This is either because they have particular experience lending to 
that sector, or because they have a lending relationship with the borrower that allows them to 
collect proprietary information about those borrowers over time. From an investor’s perspective, 
a related argument is that even sophisticated investors might have neglected tail risks (Gennaioli 
et al., 2012). 
The credit cycle is also likely to play a significant role in this setting. During good states 
of a credit cycle (i.e., upswing of the credit cycle), investors might be more willing to acquire 
riskier securities. It could also be that during credit expansions it is more difficult for investors to 
assess the true value of information intensive securities —such as CLOs5 as suggested by the 
extensive literature on adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970)— during credit booms (Dang et al., 
2012; Santos, 2015; Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011).  
In stark contrast, other studies suggest that banks might also have an incentive to 
securitize only those loans that are of intrinsic better credit risk in order to signal the quality of 
the securities (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; DeMarzo, 2005; Instefjord, 2005). Banks may also 
have an incentive to securitize less risky loans thereby increasing their risk profile for a given 
5 There is, in fact, evidence suggesting that investors did not have accurate models for pricing securitized debt, 
particularly CDOs (Jarrow et al., 2007). 
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level of capital (Calem and LaCour-Little, 2004). Maintaining their long-term reputational 
capital in the securitization market might induce banks to sell their loans of relatively better 
quality (Albertazzi et al., 2015). The signaling hypothesis would therefore suggest that based on 
observables at the time of issuance, originating banks would be securitizing those loans with 
lower credit risk. Hence we first test the following signaling hypothesis:  
H1. At issuance securitized corporate loans are of better credit quality than, otherwise similar, 
non-securitized loans. 
After securitization, originating banks might have fewer incentives to monitor borrowers 
as loans are passed on to outside investors. As a result, over time securitized loans would 
perform worse than non-securitized ones as the originating bank would monitor securitized loans 
less intensively (Petersen and Rajan, 2002). Supporting this view, some studies associated loan 
sales and securitization to looser credit monitoring (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Duffee and 
Zhou, 2001; Morrison, 2005; Parlour and Plantin, 2008; Chiesa, 2008; Kamstra et al., 2014; 
Wang and Xia, 2015). We aim to test these arguments with the following two hypotheses: 
H2. Credit quality of securitized loans evolves differently after securitization compared to non-
securitized loans. 
H3. Over time securitized corporate loans perform worse than non-securitized loans due to 
banks’ reduced monitoring incentives (Monitoring hypothesis). 
First, we examine whether there is a difference in the performance of loans when they are 
securitized. Second, to test the monitoring hypothesis we track and compare the ex-post credit 
risk of loans that are securitized versus those which are non-securitized. Further, we focus on 
those loans for which bank monitoring may have a more significant bearing on borrowers’ credit 
performance. We conjecture that collateralized loans, where assets are pledged to the bank by the 
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borrower, do not require as much monitoring as non-collateralized ones (Bester, 1985; Cerqueiro 
et al., 2015). This is because the borrower, having her assets at stake, would be less likely to 
engage in risk-shifting behavior at the expense of the lender and show, as a result, a better 
performance. If the monitoring hypothesis holds, for the sub-group of collateralized loans one 
would not expect a difference in credit performance for similar loans only on the basis of 
whether loans are securitized or not. Also within the non-collateralized sub-group, securitized 
loans would tend to perform poorly in comparison to the non-securitized ones. This is because 
the bank, having sold the loan, is less likely to devote many resources to monitor the borrower 
intensively and, at the same time, the borrower has not pledged assets in the form of collateral 
that would discourage risk-taking. 
Another possible explanation for the relative poor credit performance of securitized loans 
after securitization may be that banks are able to exploit their information advantage. Banks may 
securitize apparently better loans based on publicly observable characteristics, in order to signal 
quality while still exploiting their information advantage over outsiders. In fact, the signaling 
argument relies on the fact that outsiders could only roughly assess the credit quality of the 
borrower through observable indicators such as credit ratings or accounting statements. In 
contrast banks may possess a more accurate view on the future performance on the loans they 
originated due to their access to proprietary information on the borrower. Hence, banks would 
have an incentive to use this information and securitize apparently good loans —as could be 
inferred by outsiders from the observable characteristics of borrowers at the time of 
securitization— as the originating bank would expect those loans to perform worse compared to 
the expected path of performance as inferred by outside market observers. For example, there is 
evidence from trading in the secondary market of mortgage-backed securities suggesting that 
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banks exploit their access to inside information (Drucker and Mayer, 2008) and that prior to 
securitization, mortgage lenders adversely selected higher prepayment risk mortgages (Agarwal 
et al., 2012).  
This could be termed as the lemons hypothesis where over time securitized loans perform 
worse than non-securitized loans due to banks’ ability of exploiting their information advantage 
over outside investors. In our setup, an inferior performance of securitized compared to non-
securitized loans for both collateralized and non-collateralized instruments would be consistent 
with the lemons hypothesis, although it is difficult to rule out other possibilities that are not 
captured in our analysis.  
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
Data on loan deals is obtained from Dealogic-Loanware. It includes euro-denominated 
syndicated loans granted by euro-area banks between 2004 and 2007 to non-financial 
corporations headquartered in the euro area. Data on securitization activity comes from 
Dealogic-Bondware and Standard & Poor's.6 We limit our sample to funded and cash-flow 
(balance-sheet) CLOs issued by banks headquartered in the euro area7 and exclude refinancing 
and loans granted to finance M&A activities. We add two additional fields to our dataset, which 
allow us to identify among all syndicated loans, those that were eventually securitized. We do 
this by collecting loan-by-loan confidential information from all major European Trustees for 
6 An advantage of using Bondware and Standard & Poor's as the source for securitization data is that the names of 
the originator, date of issuance and deal proceeds are all registered. 
7 We exclude CLOs by non-bank institutions as our interest is on the effects of securitization on bank lending and 
monitoring. 
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loans issued between 2004 and 2007. In our sample, 1,795 out of 4,652 syndicated loans 
extended during this period were subsequently securitized.8  
We carefully match our database on syndicated loans with information on the expected 
probability of default (EDF) of each borrower underlying each loan from 2005 to 2010. The 
EDF, computed by Moody’s KMV, is a forward-looking firm-specific measure of the actual 
probability of default calculated using a structural approach which builds on Merton’s model to 
price corporate bond debt (Merton, 1974).9 The final EDF value, expressed as a percentage, 
represents the implied risk of default and is constructed by combining companies’ financial 
statements with stock market information and a proprietary default database maintained by 
Moody’s KMV. EDF developments are regularly used as an indicator by financial institutions, 
investors, central banks and regulators to monitor credit risks of borrowers.  
Compared to other measures of expected bank risk, the KMV methodology has various 
advantages. First, it is not based on ratings which might be biased indicators of corporate risk 
due to conflicts of interest (Bolton, 2012). Second, unlike measures of default risks derived 
exclusively from accounting information —such as Z-scores—, EDFs are not a backward-
looking indicator of risk. Third, despite their simplifying assumptions, EDF estimations of 
default risk show strong robustness to model misspecifications (Jessen and Lando, 2015).  
During the recent financial crisis and compared to other measures of default risk, the 
EDF has done relatively well as a predictor of firms’ risk on a cross-sectional perspective. That 
is, the relative positions of firms ranked according to their EDF levels in the year before the 
8 We only consider loans securitized from 2004 and 2007 as during the financial crisis the public CLO market 
ground to a halt. We do not consider the CLOs constructed to obtain central bank liquidity during the crisis.  
9 More specifically, the calculation of EDF builds on Vasicek and Kealhofer’s extension of the Black-Scholes-
Merton option-pricing. 
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crisis were good predictors of rank ordering of default risk during the crisis (Munves et al., 
2010). Analyzing the EDF performance in the crisis period both Korablev and Qu (2009) and 
Gokbayrak and Chua (2009) find that EDF predictive power of default risk is as good as or 
better than CDS spreads on their respective samples.  
KMV best applies to publicly traded companies for which the value of equity is available 
and determined by the financial markets. By matching our syndicated loan database to those 
borrowers for which an EDF measure is available reduces our sample to those borrowers that are 
listed on the stock market.10 We use borrowers’ EDF changes over time to measure the change in 
credit quality. (Munves et al., 2000). An increase in a firm’s EDF could well signal greater 
default risk, even if the current absolute level might be excessive compared to a user’s actual 
exposure. In this way EDF metrics can provide early warning of impending difficulties11. 
3.2 Model and Variables 
We first estimate a logistic model that links the probability of loan securitization to certain loan 
and borrower characteristics: 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖 = 1|X) = Φ(𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝛿∆𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝐿′𝜃 + 𝑍′𝛾)                       (1) 
 
Where Pr is the probability of securitization for loan I in the year following its issuance, 
Φ is the standard cumulative normal probability distribution, L is a set of variables controlling 
10 For those observations where the borrower has defaulted after the loan issuance are included in our analysis until 
the period of default as we use the differences in EDF to measure borrowers’ performance.   
11 It is worth to note here that Moody's KMV model does not adjust for the securitization status of the companies’ 
loans. 
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for loan characteristics, and Z is another set of variables controlling for other factors expected to 
impact on the probability of default. Loan characteristics include: loan spread (basis points), 
loan size (natural logarithm), maturity (years), presence of guarantees, collateral, instrument 
type, loan purpose (corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport finance and 
property finance). We control for industry (construction and property, high-tech industry, 
infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and transport) and date of 
issuance. We also take into account bank and syndicate characteristics as they might also impact 
on the probability of securitizing a loan (Sufi, 2007). We control for bank profitability, as there is 
evidence suggesting that less profitable banks are more likely to securitize loans (Casu et al., 
2013). We control for the impact of lead banks’ characteristics via fixed effects by identifying 75 
groups of top 20 lead banks that often participate into loan syndications —alone or 
collectively— in the European market. We control for syndicate size using the number of banks 
included on the syndicate. 
We track changes in EDF (∆EDF) to proxy for the deterioration or improvement in 
borrowers’ credit quality (henceforth performance) over time. Using this variable we examine 
the ex-post (i.e., after the loan has been securitized) credit performance of the loan controlling 
for observable characteristics at the time of origination. We use three alternative measures of 
∆EDF: 
1. ∆EDFA accounts for changes in credit risk for three time periods (one, two and three 
years) starting from the year in which the loan is issued. For example, to calculate a 
2-year forward ∆EDFA for a loan issued in 2005, we take the difference in EDF for 
that borrower by subtracting the average EDF values of 2007 and 2005. 
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2. ∆EDFB measures the differences in EDF between the year in which the loan is issued 
and three different time periods (i.e., 2008, 2009 and 2010) selected to take place 
during the financial crisis. For example, assume that loan A is issued in 2005 and loan 
B is issued in 2006, to compute the ∆EDFB for year 2008 for loan A, we take the 
difference between the EDF in 2008 and 2005. For loan B, we take the difference in 
EDF between 2008 and 2006. This alternative measure allows us to consider EDF 
changes from the time of securitization to different stages of the financial crisis. 
3. ∆EDFC measures the change in borrowers’ credit risk during the financial crisis. To 
account for this, we incorporate the ∆EDF for each borrower calculated as changes in 
EDF from the start of the financial crisis (third quarter of 2007) to three separate 
periods of the financial crisis (i.e., 2008, 2009 and 2010). For example, to calculate 
the ∆EDFC for 2008, we take the difference between the average EDF in 2008 and 
that of the third quarter of 2007. The idea is that many of the inherent risks in a 
securitization structure could be of systemic nature and materialize only in the event 
of a (large) financial crisis. 
3.3 Propensity Score Matching 
The analysis of the effect of securitization on loans’ credit quality might raise self-selection 
concerns with regard to the decision to securitize certain loans. If credit performance of 
securitized and non-securitized loans would have differed systematically regardless of 
securitization, comparing credit risk of securitized and non-securitized loans might yield biased 
estimates on the impact of securitization. Under this assumption, if securitized loans are found to 
perform differently, on average, than non-securitized ones, the difference may be due to the 
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effect of self-selection rather than to securitization. Strictly speaking, to test our hypothesis, we 
would need to know what would have happened to the credit quality of securitized loans had 
they had not been securitized. Because it is impossible to observe the same loan in both states of 
the world, we need to find an appropriate proxy for the counterfactual performance of securitized 
loans. Good candidates to proxy for this counterfactual are non-securitized loans from which we 
construct our control group. We construct this control group using a propensity score matching 
(PSM) approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) which allows us reduce the matching problem to 
a single dimension via the propensity score.  
We match our loan sample using propensity scores to compare securitized and non-
securitized loans, which are ex-ante (i.e., prior to securitization) similar in terms of their key 
observable characteristics most related to the probability of securitization. Importantly our 
control group —constructed from the non-securitized loans— is selected among those loans 
whose credit risk trajectory prior to securitization lies as close as possible to that of similar 
securitized loans. If we assume that there are no significant differences in unobservables between 
the two matched groups of loans —or that unobservables do not play a significant role on the 
potential outcome— the observed differential in performance (∆EDF) can be attributed to the 
effect of having received the treatment, which in our setting is the securitization of the loan.  
Through matching we restrict our inference to the sample of securitized and matched 
non-securitized loans. The impact of the treatment (securitization) on loan i, δi, is the difference 
between potential outcomes (∆EDF) with and without treatment: 
𝛿𝑖 = ∆𝛼𝛼𝛼1,𝑖 − ∆𝛼𝛼𝛼0,𝑖                                                  (2) 
The impact of securitization over the sample would be the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT), computed as follows:  
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𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼(∆𝛼𝛼𝛼1 − ∆𝛼𝛼𝛼0|𝐴 = 1)                                          (3) 
As indicated, the treated group (securitized loans, denoted Ti = 1 for loan i) is matched 
with a control group (non-securitized loans, denoted Ti = 0 for loan i) on the basis of its 
propensity score which is a function of loan and borrower observable characteristics: 
  𝑃(𝑋𝑖) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖),𝑤𝑠𝑠ℎ (0 < 𝑃(𝑋𝑖) < 1)                         (4) 
 In our setting the propensity score, 𝑃(𝑋𝑖), is initially estimated with a probit model where 
the binary dependent variable has a value of one for securitized loans, and zero otherwise. The 
regressors, 𝑋𝑖 include credit quality prior to securitization, loan characteristics —loan purpose, 
business industry, maturity and size— as well as bank, year and country dummies.  
There needs to be sufficient overlap in the propensity scores to match securitized and 
non-securitized loans. We impose a common support condition [(0 < 𝑃(𝑋𝑖) < 1)] that restricts 
inference to treated and non-treated units with comparable propensity scores. That is, non-treated 
units whose propensity scores are lower (or higher) than the defined minimum (maximum) are 
dropped. We exclude loans that have a 0 or 1 propensity scores to satisfy the overlap condition of 
the treatment and control samples. We employ nearest-neighbor matching where each securitized 
loan is matched with those non-securitized loans with the closest propensity scores (Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002): 
𝐶(𝑠) = min�𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗�                                                               (5) 
where by 𝐶(𝑠) is the set of control loans with an estimated value of the propensity score 
𝑝𝑖, matched to securitized loan i. We calculate our control group using matching with and 
without replacement.12 This allows us to increase the quality of the matching and decrease bias 
12 In the latter case a non-securitized loan can be used as a match more than once 
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(Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Our main results are constructed using one to one (1:1) matching 
where each securitized loan is matched with a single non-securitized loan. We also calculate 
results for two (1:2) and four (1:4) matches. Increasing the number of matches might also 
increase bias —as the second and fourth closest matches are usually further away from the 
treated loan than the first match. At the same time the use of multiple matches can decrease 
variance as the matched sample becomes larger (Rubin and Thomas, 2000).  
4 Results 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. In Panel A we display the mean, median, standard 
deviation and mean comparison (t-tests) of loan and borrower characteristics. We find that 
securitized loans tend to be smaller in size and have a longer maturity than non-securitized loans. 
The number of banks in the loan syndicate and the ratio of banks active in securitization (to total 
banks) in the syndicate are almost identical for both groups. EDFs of companies whose loans are 
non-securitized are usually higher than for companies whose loans are securitized. In Panel B we 
display the summary statistics for the dummy variables. We find that a large share of securitized 
loans are secured using collateral and tend to be leveraged. 
4.1 Whole Sample 
In Table 2 we present the results for the logistic model by employing only the level of credit risk 
(i.e., EDF) at the time of the issuance. Controlling for a set of micro and macro variables,13 we 
find that the EDF coefficient is negatively affected by the probability of loan securitization. This 
13 Note that summary statistics on these variables are not reported to keep the tables parsimonious. All these 
statistics are available upon request. 
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suggests that loans of borrowers with relatively higher default risk are less likely to be 
securitized. This finding supports H1, the signaling hypothesis, and shows that banks signal 
quality by retaining assets of poorer credit risk, as observed at issuance, and tend to securitize 
assets of initially better credit quality (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; DeMarzo, 2005; Instefjord, 
2005).  
Subsequently, we examine whether there is a performance difference between securitized 
and non-securitized loans using changes in credit risk. We relate the ex-post performance of 
borrowers (∆EDFA) to the likelihood of loan securitization to examine the link between 
probability of securitization and future performance. Results, presented in Table 3, show the 
∆EDFA for sets of one to three year time periods following loan securitization during that year. 
We report a positive relationship between the ex-post ∆EDFA and the probability of loan 
securitization for all time horizons. This suggests that the likelihood of loan securitization is 
higher for borrowers that showed worse performance.  
We present the ∆EDFB results in Table 4. Here we measure the differences in EDF 
between the year in which the loan is issued and three time periods (i.e., 2008, 2009 or 2010) 
chosen to take place during the financial crisis. We find that the coefficient of the ∆EDFB is 
significant for all time horizons and suggests that borrowers whose loans are securitized showed 
inferior performance than loans that were not. 
We are also interested in changes in borrowers’ relative performance during the financial 
crisis (∆EDFC). ∆EDFC is calculated as the changes in EDF from the start of the financial crisis 
to three separate periods that take place during the financial crisis. Results —presented in Table 
5— show that ∆EDFC has a positive and significant coefficient for the 2009 and 2010 periods 
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and are not significant for 2008. This suggests that loans of borrowers whose default risk would 
materialize in the event of a systemic crisis were more likely to be securitized.14 
Subsequently, we design an alternative setup where we use changes in EDF as dependent 
variable and securitized (equals to 1 if the loan is securitized and 0 otherwise) as a determinant 
of EDF changes. This may provide a clearer indication of the impact of securitization on future 
credit performance of the firm. Results are presented for all of our ∆EDF variables in Table 6. 
The coefficient of securitized is found to be positive and significant only for the medium term. 
Results, supporting our second hypothesis (i.e. H2), show that companies whose loans are 
securitized perform poorly compared to companies whose loans are not securitized. It is 
worthwhile to also note that size of the coefficients of securitized increases over time. 
4.2 Propensity scores 
As an alternative strategy to assess the robustness of our results we use a propensity score 
matching. This technique allows us measure the impact of securitization on credit risk using a 
comparable sample of loans. 
To verify the quality of matching graphically we first plot the distribution of the 
propensity scores for both groups (securitized or non-securitized loans), before and after 
matching, for the whole sample (Figure 1). In the unmatched sample, the propensity score 
distribution of the non-securitized loans is skewed to the left. In contrast, in the matched sample 
14 We also run linear probability models for robustness to ensure that the possible bias in the logistic model does not 
drive our results. Results do not change and available upon request.  
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the distribution of the two groups is similar. This suggests that the use of propensity score 
matching is appropriate in our context15.  
Table 7 presents the ∆EDFA results. We find that for loans of the securitized (treatment) 
group, the treatment has increased their future EDF for time horizons over 1 year and that the 
highest impact is seen in year three. In short, it shows that the credit quality of borrowers whose 
loans are securitized deteriorates significantly in comparison to the control group. 
The highest impact is observed after three years as suggested by the coefficients for the 
average treatment of the treated (ATT). This seems a plausible result as we are looking at loans 
that already have an observable credit risk indicator (i.e., EDF). For such loans one would expect 
that the change in credit quality would take time as outsiders (such as CLO investors) can 
already assess the initial credit risk as assessed by financial markets via EDFs. In other words, 
the effect of banks’ informational advantage over outsiders would not surface completely in the 
short-term and would materialize gradually over time. 
Table 8 presents ATTs results for ∆EDFB. We find that only ∆EDFB for year 2009 is 
significant when the treated is matched with four controls. ∆EDFB was expected to capture the 
dramatic shift in borrowers’ EDF values immediately after the start of the financial crisis in 
2008. We only marginally observed that effect in 2009. We present ATTs for ∆EDFC in Table 9. 
In line with the results presented above securitized loans performed worse in the post-crisis 
period, although only the difference in EDF in 2009 is statistically significant.  
15 Ex-ante loan characteristics for the matched sample show that the loans are similar across observable 
characteristics after matching. This table is available upon request. 
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Thus far our results suggest that loans of borrowers with relatively higher default risk are 
less likely to be securitized, supporting the signaling hypothesis. We also show that borrowers of 
securitized loans performed poorly when compared to borrowers of non-securitized loans. There 
may be two ways to explain these findings. It could be that securitized loans may be performing 
more poorly due to banks’ weaker incentives to carefully monitor borrowers (i.e., monitoring 
hypothesis). Alternatively, and more speculatively, banks may be exploiting their informational 
advantage over outsiders. That is, banks might be better able to predict more accurately future 
performance of the loans and keep as a result the better ones (i.e., lemons hypothesis). We test 
the monitoring hypothesis (i.e. H3) by examining the performance of borrowers whose loans are 
more reliant on bank monitoring. We hypothesize that collateralized loans, where assets are 
pledged against the loan by the borrower, do not require as much monitoring as non-
collateralized loans. This is because the borrower, having her assets at stake, would be more 
vigilant about taking on excessive risks. If the monitoring hypothesis holds, then, there should 
not be performance differences between similar securitized and non-securitized loans within the 
sub-group of non-collateralized loans. In addition within the non-collateralized loans sub-group, 
securitized loans should perform more poorly than non-securitized ones due to bank lesser 
monitoring incentives. Next section presents our findings for the two sub-groups. 
4.3 Collateralized versus Non-collateralized Loans 
We repeat our analysis and distinguish between those corporate loans requiring and not requiring 
collateral. Results for logit models for all three versions of ∆EDF are presented in Table 10. For 
∆EDFA we do not find any significant coefficients for the collateralized loans group (columns I-
III). Conversely, in the non-collateralized group, ∆EDFA is positive and statistically significant 
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for all time horizons (columns X to XII). For non-collateralized loans the likelihood of a loan 
being securitized is higher if the borrower performed poorly after issuance. Results for ∆EDFB 
are presented for collateralized (columns IV-VI) and non-collateralized (columns XIII-XV) loans 
respectively. For all time horizons of ∆EDFB, the results show that borrowers of securitized 
loans were more likely to perform poorly. We also observe significant negative coefficients for 
collateralized loans for 2010. These results provide some, albeit weaker, evidence that banks 
kept collateralized loans that are expected to show an inferior performance in their books rather 
than securitizing them. Results for ∆EDFC are shown in columns VII-XI, for collateralized, and 
XVI-XVIII, for non-collateralized loans. For non-collateralized loans we find significant and 
positive coefficients for all years. Overall, Table 10 provides tentative evidence suggesting that 
among securitized borrowers, the EDF of borrowers whose loans were not collateralized 
increased significantly more compared to borrowers whose loans were collateralized. We also 
run OLS regressions with our alternative setup where changes in EDF are the dependent 
variables and securitized is used as an explanatory variable. Results on Table 11 show that 
securitized loans are more likely to show worse performance if they are non-collaterized. This 
finding is consistent across all horizons and more significant in the longer term. 
In Table 12 we present the results for propensity score matched estimations for the two 
sub-groups. We find that none of the coefficients for the ∆EDF (A, B or C) variables are 
significant for loans that are collateralized. For the non-collateralized sample, coefficients of ATT 
are statistically significant and positively related to the probability of securitization only for 
∆EDFA variables for 2 and 3 year horizons. It is worthwhile to note that for ∆EDFA, ATT 
increases over time where the largest difference is reported Year 3. In other words the difference 
becomes more prevalent in the long-term as the effects of banks’ reduced monitoring of the 
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borrower gradually start influencing corporates’ performance. These findings provide indirect 
evidence for the monitoring hypothesis. Banks, having sold the loan to third parties, may be less 
interested in monitoring the borrower which in turn, may have affected the borrower’s 
performance. This interpretation is driven by the fact that we observe more deterioration in credit 
quality for non-collateralized loans that are securitized. On the other hand, we do not find any 
evidence for the lemons hypothesis.  
5 Conclusions 
We examine the relative performance of corporate borrowers whose loans were securitized in 
Europe during the period preceding the financial crisis. We find that banks do not seem to have 
selected and securitized loans of lower quality to outsiders, providing evidence consistent with 
the signaling argument. Banks seem to have kept poorer quality corporate loans to signal the 
quality of the securitized assets to the investors. We also show that following securitization, the 
credit quality of borrowers whose loans are securitized deteriorated significantly over time 
compared to the control group. We find that poor performance is possibly linked to the 
weakening in monitoring activities by banks after securitization as, within securitized loans, non-
collateralized ones show worse performance than securitized ones. 
In the post-crisis period, European policy makers, recognizing the potential benefits of 
securitization to the financial system, are considering policy options to transform and revive 
securitization markets in the EU (European Central Bank, 2014). Having a better understanding 
of the financial stability implications of securitization can help to develop a robust securitization 
market. Our results vouch for the advantages of setting up mechanisms to improve the 
information quality on the collateral pledged by borrowers. These might include credit registers 
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with enhanced mark to market information on collateral values. Robust originator risk retention 
requirements may also help in mitigating the reduced monitoring incentives after securitization.    
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Table 1                   
Descriptive Statistics                   
Panel A                 Mean 
comparison   Non-securitized (N=429)   Securitized (N=89)   
Loan characteristics Mean  Median  Std. dev   Mean  Median  Std. dev   t-values 
Spread 138 87.5 160   310 275 181   -9.01*** 
Size (million Euro) 670 242 1,328   435 170 819   1.60       
Maturity 5.8 5.6 2.1   8.1 8 1.4   -9.88*** 
Syndicate size 13.9 11 10.1   13.4 10 11.4   0.41       
Securitization active banks 0.69 0.69 0.18   0.69 0.64 0.19   -0.00       
EDF 0.41 0.08 1.31   0.17 0.05 0.31   1.72*      
                    
Panel B - Percentage of loans                 
  Non-securitized     Securitized       
Secured 35.79%     52.85%       
Subordinated 4.22%     17.99%       
Sponsored 53.47%     97.02%       
Instrument type                   
    Term loan 29.01%     14.64%       
    Term loan A 9.82%     16.13%       
    Term loan B 5.82%     28.54%       
    Term loan C 4.19%     26.18%       
    Revolving credit 29.80%     4.34%       
    Credit facility 12.82%     0.12%       
    Other 8.54%     10.05%       
Risk and credit ratings                   
Leveraged 53.82%     98.88%       
Investment grade 45.51%     1.12%       
Highly leveraged 0.67%     0.00%       
Rated 12.79%     6.45%       
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Table 2   
Probability of loan securitization and default risk at loan issuance   
This table presents coefficient estimates for logit regression estimating the probability of loan securitization 
within one year of loan issuance. EDF is the expected default frequency, computed by Moody’s KMV, at the time 
of loan issuance. We control for observable loan and syndicate characteristics at the time of loan origination. Loan 
characteristics include: spread (basis point over LIBOR), size, maturity, if the loan is secured, if the loan is 
subordinated, if the loan is sponsored, loan rating, type of loan and if the loan is leveraged. Syndicated 
characteristics include the number of the banks in the lending syndicate and the ratio of securitization active banks 
within the syndicate over the total number of banks. Bank characteristics include average profitability of the 
banks within the syndicate and controls for possible lead bank effects on the syndicate. Loan purpose is controlled 
for using dummy variables (categorized as general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport 
finance, corporate control and property finance). Business Industry is controlled for using dummy variables 
(categorized as construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, 
manufacturing and transport). Year dummy variables control for the macroeconomic conditions. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
EDF -0.690* 
  (0.392) 
    
Controls for:   
    Loan characteristics Yes 
    Syndicate characteristics Yes 
    Bank characteristics Yes 
    Loan purpose Yes 
    Business industry Yes 
    Year dummy variables Yes 
    
Constant -11.4*** 
  (1.766) 
Number of observations 518 
Pseudo R-squared 0.5 
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Table 3       
Probability of loan securitization and change in default risk after loan issuance   
This table presents coefficient estimates for logit regressions estimating the probability of loan securitization within one 
year of loan issuance. EDF is the expected default frequency, computed by Moody’s KMV, at the time of loan issuance. 
∆EDFA are changes in borrower credit quality to a certain period after issuance. For example if the loan is issued in 2005 
then ∆EDFA within 1 year of the borrower equals the EDF in 2006 minus the EDF in 2005 divided by EDF in 2005. We 
control for observable loan and syndicate characteristics at the time of loan origination. Loan characteristics include: 
spread (basis point over LIBOR), size, maturity, if the loan is secured, if the loan is subordinated, if the loan is sponsored, 
loan rating, type of loan and if the loan is leveraged. Syndicated characteristics include the number of the banks in the 
lending syndicate and the ratio of securitization active banks within the syndicate over the total number of banks. Bank 
characteristics include average profitability of the banks within the syndicate and controls for possible lead bank effects 
on the syndicate. Loan purpose is controlled for using dummy variables (categorized as general corporate use, capital 
structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property finance). Business Industry is controlled for 
using dummy variables (categorized as construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related 
services, state, manufacturing and transport). Year dummy variables control for the macroeconomic conditions. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  I II III 
EDF -0.952*** -1.327*** -1.259** 
  -0.289 -0.331 -0.587 
∆EDFA within       
1 year 0.899**     
  -0.399     
2 year   0.481***   
    -0.133   
3 year     0.207*** 
      -0.059 
Controls for:       
    Loan characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
    Syndicate characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
    Bank characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
    Loan purpose Yes Yes Yes 
    Business industry Yes Yes Yes 
    Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes 
        
Constant -12.4*** -15.1*** -14.8*** 
  -1.879 -2.33 -2.347 
Number of observations 474 460 446 
Pseudo R-squared 0.53 0.58 0.6 
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Table 4       
Loan securitization and change in default risk from issuance to crisis 
This table presents coefficient estimates for logit regressions estimating the probability of loan securitization within one 
year of loan issuance. EDF is the expected default frequency, computed by Moody’s KMV, at the time of loan issuance. 
∆EDFB are changes in borrower credit quality from issuance to different periods of the financial crisis. For example if the 
loan is issued in 2006 then ∆ in EDFB from the loan issuance to 2008 equals the EDF in 2008 minus the EDF in 2006 
divided by EDF in 2006. We control for observable loan and syndicate characteristics at the time of loan origination. Loan 
characteristics include: spread (basis point over LIBOR), size, maturity, if the loan is secured, if the loan is subordinated, if 
the loan is sponsored, if the loan is rated, type of loan and leveraged loan. Syndicated characteristics include the number of 
the banks in the lending syndicate and the ratio of securitization active banks within the syndicate over the total number of 
banks. Bank characteristics include average profitability of the banks within the syndicate and controls for possible lead 
bank effects on the syndicate. Loan purpose is controlled for using dummy variables (categorized as general corporate use, 
capital structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property finance). Business industry is controlled 
for using dummy variables (categorized as construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related 
services, state, manufacturing and transport). Year dummy variables control for the macroeconomic conditions. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  I II III 
EDF -1.100** -1.076* -0.736** 
  (0.554) (0.591) (0.301) 
∆EDFB from the loan issuance to     
2008 0.293**     
  (0.143)     
2009   0.153***   
    (0.056)   
2010     0.112** 
      (0.044) 
Controls for:       
    Loan characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
    Syndicate characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
    Bank characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
    Loan purpose Yes Yes Yes 
    Business industry Yes Yes Yes 
    Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes 
        
Constant -13.995*** -15.132*** -15.247*** 
  (2.204) (2.511) (2.482) 
        
Number of observations 446 417 428 
Pseudo R-squared 0.57 0.61 0.61 
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Table 5       
Loan securitization and change in default risk during financial crisis  
This table presents coefficient estimates for logit regressions estimating the probability of loan securitization within one year 
of loan issuance. EDF is the expected default frequency, computed by Moody’s KMV, at the time of the loan issuance. ∆EDFC 
are changes in borrower credit quality during the financial crisis. We control for observable loan and syndicate characteristics 
at the time of the loan origination. Loan characteristics include: spread (basis point over LIBOR), size, maturity, if the loan is 
secured, if the loan is subordinated, if the loan is sponsored, if the loan is rated, type of loan and if the loan is leveraged. 
Syndicated characteristics include the number of the banks in the lending syndicate and the ratio of securitization active banks 
within the syndicate over the total number of banks. Bank characteristics include average profitability of the banks within the 
syndicate and controls for possible lead bank effects on the syndicate. Loan purpose is controlled for using dummy variables 
(categorized as general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property 
finance). Business Industry is controlled for using dummy variables (categorized as construction and property, high-tech 
industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and transport). Year dummy variables control for the 
macroeconomic conditions. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  I II III 
EDF -1.273** -1.095* -0.748** 
  (0.581) (0.613) (0.309) 
∆EDFC from Q3:2007 to       
2008 0.281*     
  (0.157)     
2009   0152***   
    (0.056)   
2010     0.114*** 
      (0.044) 
Controls for:       
    Loan characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
    Syndicate characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
    Bank characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
    Loan purpose Yes Yes Yes 
    Business industry Yes Yes Yes 
    Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes 
        
Constant -13.9*** -15.1*** -15.3*** 
  (2.206) (2.516) (2.490) 
No of observations 444 412 423 
Pseudo R-squared 0.57 0.61 0.61 
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Table 12           
Change in default risk for collateralized and non-collateralized with matched sample using 
propensity scores 
The table reports the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). It shows propensity score matching estimates of the average treatment effect 
of securitization on the default risk, ∆EDF, of the securitized loans. The average treatment effect of securitization on ∆EDF is estimated as the 
difference between securitized and matched non-securitized loans. ∆EDFA are changes in borrowers’ credit quality to a certain period after 
issuance. For example if the loan is issued in 2005, ∆EDF within 1 year equals the EDF in 2006 minus the EDF in 2005 divided by EDF in 2005. 
∆EDFB are changes in borrower credit quality from issuance to different periods of the financial crisis. For example if the loan is issued in 2006 
then ∆EDF from the loan issuance to 2008 equals the EDF in 2008 minus the EDF in 2006 divided by EDF in 2006. ∆EDFC are changes in 
borrower credit quality during the financial crisis. Robust standard errors are bootstrapped and presented in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represents 
significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  Collateralized loans   Non-collateralized loans 
  ATT 
Number of 
observations   ATT 
Number of 
observations 
∆EDFA within           
1 year 0.047 143   0.373     331 
  (0.111)     (0.274)   
2 year 0.195 129   1.773***   331 
  (0.493)     (0.689)   
3 year 1.022 124   3.906**      322 
  (1.567)     (1.919)   
∆EDFB from issuance to           
2008 0.198 124   0.411 322 
  (0.388)     (0.961)   
2009 0.574 113   2.004 304 
  (1.951)     (2.849)   
2010 2.165 118   1.531 310 
  (3.481)     (2.702)   
∆EDFC from Q3:2007 to           
2008 0.193 124   0.131 320 
  (0.276)     (0.727)   
2009 0.555 113   2.082 299 
  (2.233)     (2.927)   
2010 2.141 118   1.697 305 
  (2.128)     (2.753)   
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